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The evaluation of public health education initiatives on smoking and lung 
cancer: an ethical critique 
 
This chapter considers the way in which public health education initiatives are 
evaluated.  In particular, our concern is with such evaluation when it is done in 
terms of behavioural outcomes, such as how many people give up smoking.  Our 
main claim is that this method of evaluation is scientifically and ethically flawed.  
We use the example of initiatives on smoking and lung cancer.  This is because 
smoking is known to be a hugely important contributor to illness and to health 
inequality and because there have been many such initiatives.  However, the 
criticisms we make of initiatives relating to smoking and lung cancer apply 
equally to many other public health initiatives.  Indeed, some criticisms might 
apply more forcefully given that the epidemiological evidence for the link between 
smoking and lung cancer is stronger than that available for any other link 
between behaviour and an illness. 
 
We begin the chapter by looking at how health education initiatives in the area of 
smoking and lung cancer are evaluated.  We show it is done primarily in terms of 
behaviour change, particularly quit rates.  We suggest this is because behaviour 
change is a good marker for future health benefits which might only accrue over 
many years: a drop in rates of smoking now could be expected to deliver 
significant health benefits in the future.  However, we argue that looking at 
behaviour change alone is problematic as it ignores the possibility of unwanted 
effects from a public health initiative.  We give some evidence for such unwanted 
effects based on our own empirical research.   
 
In the light of this, we look at the two alternative methods of evaluation.  The first 
involves a broader examination of public health initiatives, looking for both 
desired and undesired effects.  This would accord with the usual standard of 
evidence-based medicine as in, for example, randomised trials.  We argue that 
whilst this full-effect evaluation is preferable to evaluation based on behaviour 
change alone, neither is ethically satisfactory.  In particular, it ignores the fact 
that it would be possible successfully to educate someone about a health issue 
without that person then deciding to change her behaviour.  This is because of 
the role that people's values play in deciding how to behave.  Evaluation that 
ignores this is compatible with unethical initiatives that, say, deliberately 
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overstate a case in order to get the desired health outcome.  For this reason, we 
argue that health education initiatives on lung cancer and smoking should be 
evaluated primarily as education.  On this account, what matters is that health 
education initiatives provide the information and understanding people need in 
order to decide whether or not they wish to smoke.   
 
Finally, we consider the issue of whether professionals should target people's 
values, for example, the values of those who consider smoking a worthwhile 
pleasure.  We argue that it is ethically acceptable in principle but raises awkward 
questions concerning which values to target. 
 
I. What is a public health education initiative? 
In the UK at present (2008) the term "public health education" has a quaint, old-
fashioned ring.  The Government body, the Health Education Authority was 
abolished in 2000 and replaced by the Health Development Authority.  The remit 
of the former included a large role in education of the public.  This disappeared 
in the remit of the latter, which was to develop the evidence base to improve 
health and reduce inequality.  The Health Development Authority has since been 
absorbed into the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
which is largely concerned with assessing the evidence for the provision of 
treatments under the National Health Service (NHS).  Whilst the notion of health 
education has disappeared there has been the recent emergence of "social 
marketing"; this bears some resemblance to health education but we shall argue 
that it is significantly different. 
 
We shall need a working definition of public health education.  Hence: a public 
health education initiative is one that aims to tackle a public health problem 
through education of the public.  This paper is concerned with such initiatives in 
the realm of lung cancer and smoking.  An example would be one that aimed to 
inform smokers that their habit hugely increases their risk of lung cancer.  Such 
messages are either implicitly or explicitly core elements of recent education 
campaigns in the UK.  A mix of media has been used including television, 
billboards and newspaper advertisements.   
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II. How are public health education initiatives in lung cancer and smoking 
evaluated? 
We have looked at the four key White Papers produced over the last 16 years that 
guide service delivery in terms of public health generally and more specifically, 
smoking cessation.  Our review began with the Health of the Nation (Department 
of Health 1992).  This was the first UK public health policy with measurable 
targets and outcomes.  It also made clear that health education would be a key 
component in Government responses to public health problems such as smoking 
and lung cancer.  The other White Papers we examined were Our Healthier Nation 
(Department of Health 1999), Smoking Kills (Department of Health 1998) and 
Choosing Health (Department of Health 2004).  The first and second of these 
White Papers are located chronologically at the beginning of the period under a 
"New Labour" government; the third is located where that party had been in 
power for seven years.  We have analysed the papers to identify the evaluation or 
outcome measures the policy set in relation to smoking and lung cancer.  Our 
findings are that the measures of success focus exclusively on behaviour with no 
education outcomes included (Table 1).  Targets and outcomes relate to reducing 
smoking prevalence and cigarette consumption.   
 
Table 1. Smoking targets from UK health policy 1992- 2004 
White Paper Outcome measure 
Health of the Nation 
(1992) 
B4/B5.  To reduce the death rate for lung 
cancer by at least 30% in men under 75 and 15% in 
women under 75 by 2010 (from 60 per 100,000 for 
men and 24.1 per 100,000 for women in 1990 to no 
more than 42 and 20.5 respectively). 
 
B6/A5. To reduce the prevalence of cigarette 
smoking in men and women aged 16 and over to no 
more than 20% by the year 2000 (a reduction of at 
least 30% in men and 29% in women from a 
prevalence in 1990 of 31% and 28% respectively). 
 
B7.  In addition to reduction in overall 
prevalence, at least a third of women smokers to 
stop smoking at the start of their pregnancy by the 
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year 2000. 
 
B8.  To reduce the consumption of 
cigarettes by at least 40% by the year 2000 (from 98 
billion manufactured cigarettes in the 1990 to 59 
billion). 
 
B9.  To reduce smoking prevalence among 
11-15 year olds by at least 33% by 1994 (from 
about 8% in 1988 to less than 6%). 
Our Healthier Nation/ 
Smoking Kills (1998/9) 
1. To reduce smoking among children from 13% to 
9% or less by the year 2010; with a fall to 11% by 
the year 2005. 
 
2. To reduce adult smoking in all social classes so 
that the overall rate falls from 28% to 24% or less 
by the year 2010; with a fall to 26% by the year 
2005. 
 
3. To reduce the percentage of women who smoke 
during pregnancy from 23% to 15% by the year 
2010; with a fall to 18% by the year 2005. 
Choosing Health (2004) Reducing adult smoking rates from 26% in 2002 to 
21% or less in 2010, with a reduction in prevalence 
among routine manual groups from 31% in 2002 to 
26% or less in 2010 
 
 
This emphasis on behavioural outcomes is seen also in the reviews of evidence 
available regarding smoking and lung cancer.  Two reputable and influential 
sources of evidence are the Cochrane Collaboration and the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (accessed on www.cochrane.org and 
www.nice.org.uk).  The majority of reviews of evidence on these sites focus on 
smoking cessation interventions rather than education interventions.  NICE have 
recently published guidance on behaviour change (NICE 2007).  This again 
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indicates an exclusive focus on behaviour over education.  It is behaviour change 
that matters, not what people know about their health. 
 
In response to the Smoking Kills White paper, the Government invested heavily in 
smoking cessation services.  Services have employed diverse strategies and 
activities to address smoking and smoking related illness.  Education is an 
aspect of some of these approaches. But it is noteworthy that the emphasis on 
behavioural targets is now reflected in the interventions themselves.  For example, 
in Yorkshire and Humberside a recent (unpublished) document "Achieving four 
week quit targets: making it easier for smokers to quit" recommends inter alia the 
following interventions:  
 Brief opportunistic advice from a health care professional to stop 
 Face-to-face intensive behavioural support from a specialist 
 Proactive telephone counselling 
 Written self-help materials 
 
In targeting the behaviour of smoking it is clear that smokers are to be put under 
some pressure to change their lifestyle. 
 
III. Why are the initiatives evaluated on the basis of behavioural criteria? 
Why are public health education initiatives on lung cancer and smoking 
primarily evaluated in behavioural terms alone?  The answer lies partly in the 
more general movement towards evidence-based medicine and health care.  The 
idea behind this movement is well known and widely accepted: in summary it is 
as follows.  Health care interventions should be based upon the best available 
research evidence.  All evidence-based health care works on the basis of a theory 
of cause and effect (Harrison 2003).  An action causes an outcome via a 
mechanism.  For example, the action could be giving patients suffering a heart 
attack a dose of thrombolytic (clot-busting) therapy; the outcome, reducing 
mortality and morbidity in that group; and the mechanism, the chain of 
reactions that lead to thrombolysis once the drug is administered.  One of the 
main purposes of health care research is to reveal action and outcome and to 
suggest a mechanism.  The focus should be on outcomes that are both 
measurable and of importance.   
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In public health the picture is less straightforward.  Take our main example: 
smoking and lung cancer.  Here there are two theories in play.  The first is the 
theory of what causes lung cancer: the action is smoking, the outcome is lung 
cancer and the mechanism is, say, irritation of the mucosa.  The evidence base 
derives from epidemiology.  The second theory is of what prevents lung cancer: 
the action is public health education on smoking and cancer, the outcome is 
improved public health or reduced levels of lung cancer and the mechanism is 
people giving up smoking.  We make two observations here. 
 
First, with both theories it is difficult to get evidence of the standard of a 
randomised controlled trial: the public health environment is one in which so 
many factors are at play it is hard to control for them all.  This is clearly true in 
epidemiology, which relies on surveying huge numbers to overcome the problem.  
However, it is also true in the research of public health policy, where a wide 
range of qualitative and quantitative research is used.  The second observation is 
that it will usually be many years before the desired outcome of the public health 
education will eventuate.  In the light of this, public health professionals 
concerned with the effectiveness of their interventions will focus evaluation on 
what can be measured: the mechanism, for example, people quitting smoking.  
The epidemiological evidence will provide a background that is assumed correct 
and thus assures the professional that if her action triggers the desired 
mechanism, the public health benefit will eventually follow. 
 
To summarise: public health education initiatives on lung cancer and smoking 
are primarily evaluated on behavioural terms alone.  This is because the evidence 
of health benefit from such initiatives is deferred, often by many years.  
Reference to behavioural change from which health benefit is assumed to flow 
(on the basis of epidemiological evidence) provides an apparently good alternative; 
it provides a good fit with evidence-based medicine. For example, epidemiology 
has established beyond doubt the link between lung cancer and smoking.  From 
this basis professionals can assume that the mechanism, people stopping 
smoking, will be effective on the outcome, reduced rates of lung cancer.  
Therefore, they need only assess whether or not their interventions are 
successful in triggering the mechanism; they know the outcome will follow. 
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IV. How the initiatives could be evaluated: full effects 
One problem with looking at behavioural outcomes alone when evaluating public 
health initiatives is that it ignores the possibility that there might be other, 
perhaps harmful, effects that should be set against the benefit of behaviour 
change.  Even in the case of smoking and lung cancer there may be risks or 
harms as well as benefits from health education initiatives deemed successful in 
behavioural terms.  To illustrate this point we draw on our recent research 
identifying factors that contribute to a delay in lung cancer diagnosis (Tod et al 
2008).  This examined the pathway of people from first symptom to lung cancer 
diagnosis and identified a number of issues that helped and hindered people in 
reporting their symptoms to a health professional.  The data identified examples 
of how health education regarding smoking cessation can have unanticipated 
harmful effects as well as the anticipated benefit of encouraging people to stop 
smoking.  Let us turn to these harmful effects. 
 
First, as with other research (Chapple et al 2004), the study revealed a prevailing 
expectation that people with lung cancer would experience blame and stigma.  
Participants reported an expectation that smokers would be blamed and held 
responsible for developing lung cancer.  This belief was reinforced by the tone of 
stop smoking education campaigns and the way health professionals had treated 
smokers in the past.   
“Whenever you see warnings about cancer, there’s always a cigarette there. 
I don’t think I’ve seen a warning where there hasn’t been a cigarette and I 
think that’s wrong” (68 year old male with terminal lung cancer. Ex-
smoker of 25 years) 
 
“I’ve got a friend who has a hacking cough because she smokes and I’m 
always saying to her, “you ought to get that looked at.”  She said, “I’m not 
going to the doctor because the minute they find out I’m a smoker I get in 
trouble”. So you don’t go because you don’t want to be ticked off” (Wife of 
67 year old male with terminal lung cancer. Ex-smoker of 25 years). 
 
There was a perception that smokers would be stigmatised and seen as 
undeserving of health care.  This perception created a sense of being ostracised 
and added to delay in symptom reporting. 
Evaluation of public health education initiatives 8 
“I mean it’s all been focused on smoking and I’m not denying that that is 
what probably caused my cancer and other people’s cancer, but, ….I don’t 
know, by dictatorial ways or pressing people, making you feel ostracised, 
doesn’t work”! (65 year old woman. 18 month survivor of lung cancer 
following lung resection. Ex-smoker who gave up on diagnosis). 
 
Interestingly, even those who were non- or ex-smokers delayed in reporting 
symptoms because of an expectation they would be stigmatized as a smoker and 
blamed for their illness.  This expectation was reinforced by experience.  Health 
professionals assumed that they were smokers and kept asking about smoking 
status. 
“They keep asking have I smoked?  Have I drunk?  It’s mainly have I 
smoked … anytime?  I says, “No.”  The only thing I have is gone into bingo 
where there’s been smoke” (63 year old woman with terminal lung cancer. 
Non-smoker). 
 
Thus the tone and content of smoking cessation health education campaigns 
may promote symptom-reporting delay, contributing to delayed diagnosis and a 
poorer chance of survival. 
 
Second, in health education campaigns, lung cancer is used as a threat to 
promote smoking cessation.  On the basis of such education campaigns some ex-
smokers and non-smokers believed they were not at risk of lung cancer.  The 
following scenario illustrates the point. Two men had both given up smoking over 
twenty years ago, on the birth of their first child. This was motivated by a desire 
to protect the health of the child and to be healthy and provide for their child’s 
future.  Their decision was influenced by a belief, derived from health education 
messages, that if they gave up smoking their lungs would be clear and their risk 
of lung cancer would be nil.  
“I packed up smoking and then after ten years you hear stories, you know, 
“well, it’s all cleared out your system and everything” and I thought, I’m 
never going to get lung cancer or any other one come to that.  I’m not 
smoking" (68 year old male with terminal lung cancer. Ex-smoker of 25 
years). 
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This belief that they were not at risk of lung cancer meant that as symptoms 
emerged, and got worse, they continued to ignore them or explain them away as 
something else.   
“I mean I gave up 25 years ago so you almost forgot that you ever were a 
smoker” (67 year old male with terminal lung cancer. Ex-smoker of 25 
years). “If he’d been a smoker and he was getting breathless and he … his 
irritating cough had got worse It would be different.… we might well have 
said, “Hang on, you’d better get this looked at,” I think everybody 
associates lung cancer with smoking and if you don’t smoke they assume 
you’re not at risk”. (Wife). 
 
An additional issue to emerge from the experiences of these two participants was 
the lack of awareness of the risks of second-hand smoke.  Both men thought 
their risk of lung cancer was nil after stopping smoking.  This was despite 
working and socializing in smoky atmospheres.  It was only after diagnosis that 
they realised the lung cancer risk from passive smoking. 
“But he worked in a smoky atmosphere and …. I think most people think, 
“Oh I don’t smoke.  I’m safe,” and that’s not true…. But the message that 
comes across is that it’s the cancer of the smoker, so if you’re not a smoker 
you can sit back and think, “Well, I’m not going to get that” ((Wife of 67 year 
old male with terminal lung cancer. Ex-smoker of 25 years). 
 
Thus public health education initiatives can have negative consequences even 
where the epidemiological evidence is exceptionally strong as it is with lung 
cancer and smoking.  This gives us our case for a fuller assessment of health 
education initiatives; not just in terms of whether they work on behaviour change 
or not but in terms of whether they have other, unanticipated, effects.  In other 
words, such initiatives should be judged as other health initiatives are judged, on 
all of their effects not simply on their desirable ones.   
 
Someone defending the behavioural method of evaluation might respond that any 
ill-effects of successful education initiatives to reduce smoking will easily be 
outweighed by the benefits; spending time and money measuring the ill-effects 
would be pointless.  To deploy such an argument the evidence would need to 
assure a very strong health benefit from a public health mechanism.  It is 
arguable that this is the case with smoking and lung cancer.  Even then, however, 
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failing to look for the negative aspects of health education initiatives seems to 
block the way for improving future initiatives.  On these grounds alone we believe 
the full-effects evaluation is superior to the behaviour-based evaluation.   
 
There is one further, speculative point that might add support for using the full-
effect evaluation rather than behaviour evaluation.  Public health agencies are 
charged with reducing health inequality.  But the adverse outcomes of health 
education initiatives might be such as to fall disproportionately in deprived areas 
and thus increase inequality.  The adverse effects certainly occur in areas of 
deprivation (Tod and Craven 2006, Tod et al  2008).  They also occur 
disproportionately: South Yorkshire is a relatively deprived area which suffers 
rates of lung cancer much higher than the national average; and within South 
Yorkshire, the most deprived areas have the highest lung cancer rates (Directors 
of Public Health of South Yorkshire, 2006).  In that health inequality is itself a 
problem that needs addressing, the full-effects evaluation should be undertaken.  
It could be, for example, that misunderstanding of public health information is 
greater in areas of deprivation.  If that were so, then such information could 
contribute to increases in inequality.   
 
Overall, therefore, we believe it is better for those involved in health education to 
evaluate possible unexpected and ill-effects of their initiatives; not simply to 
assume on the basis of epidemiology that behaviour change will lead to 
overwhelming benefit.  This is of import also to social marketing, the application 
of marketing methods that are usually used to effect consumer behaviour change 
instead to effect population health-behaviour change (Grier and Bryant 2005).  
Its sole focus on behaviour change makes it vulnerable to our criticism of the 
behavioural method of evaluation.   
 
V. How the initiatives could be evaluated: Education and attitudes 
However, even full-effect evaluation of public health education initiatives in the 
area of lung cancer and smoking is problematic.  There is a conceptual difference 
between health education and health treatment.  A health treatment has the 
unproblematic goal (usually) of improving health in some way.  With education, 
the goal is usually to educate: that people will gain knowledge or skills.  Public 
health education could be evaluated in such a way: for example, we could 
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evaluate initiatives on the basis of whether or not people learnt the relevant facts 
about smoking, lung cancer and health. 
 
This conceptual difference marks a significant ethical difference (Buchanan 
2006).  In the previous section we showed a number of people who either gave up 
smoking or never smoked at least in part because of health education initiatives.  
If we were to ask whether these initiatives were successful on the basis of 
behaviour change then clearly they were; people gave up smoking.  Similarly, on 
the basis of overall effects the initiatives were successful; although some of the 
cancer sufferers had a delayed diagnosis because of false beliefs gained through 
health education they nonetheless benefited overall; had they continued to 
smoke they would very likely have died much sooner.  However, if we were to 
evaluate the initiatives in terms of health education our response would be 
different: these people had not learnt all the relevant facts about smoking; indeed, 
they had taken on some false beliefs.  It was not a success. 
 
Of course, there may not necessarily be a conflict between the full-effect and 
education approaches.  It may be that the health benefits would have been even 
greater if people had taken on true beliefs at the outset: for example, knowing 
that ceasing smoking hugely reduces but does not eliminate the risk of lung 
cancer.  But there is a genuine tension here.  Should health education be viewed 
as propaganda for health in which overstated or even deceitful claims can be 
made?  Would it matter were people to believe smoking to be more dangerous 
than it is and stopping smoking more beneficial so long as they give up?   
 
These questions mirror a classic standoff between utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
ethical positions, the former defending deception, the latter decrying it (Jackson 
2001, Kozlowski and Edwards 2005).  Perhaps it is unlikely that many would 
defend deception of the population in order to effect behaviour change.  
Nonetheless, the evaluation of health education either using the behavioural 
method or the (better) full-effect analysis invites the view that the good obtained 
through changing smoking behaviour outweigh any concerns about, for example, 
over-advocacy.  By contrast, from other viewpoints, it is important that we 
convey information in such a way that people are able to weigh up true 
information and make decisions on that basis, even if those decisions are not 
what we want them to be.  It is difficult to give an overwhelming argument 
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against the utilitarian defence of deception or over-advocacy.  However, we do not 
generally accept anything less than informed consent to treatment in other areas 
of health care; it is unclear why health education should be different.   
 
There is an alternative, non-utilitarian defence of using full-effect rather than the 
health education criteria.  Someone might say that there is no need for deception; 
the facts are clear enough.  Once people fully understand the dangers of smoking 
then almost all will want to give up or not to start.  The only additional point 
health care professionals should bear in mind is the need to help people 
overcome addiction or peer pressure.  For reasons that will become apparent, we 
call this the shared-values argument.  It is an argument that appears to underlie 
much public health policy.  For example, in the White Paper Choosing Health 
(discussed earlier) there is frequent slippage between the terms "healthy choice" 
and "informed choice".  The implication is that no-one properly informed would 
make an unhealthy choice.  Let us set out this argument in more detail before 
going on to show its problems.   
 
Discussing this argument requires, first, that we set out a basic model of human 
action.  Because public health professionals have been concerned with people's 
health behaviour they have been interested in action theory: theory concerned 
with why people act as they do.  Such theory belongs primarily to the realms of 
psychology and philosophy.  Various models have been employed (Allmark 2005, 
Azjen 1991, Megone 2000, Tones and Tilford 2001).  From these it is possible to 
identify a simple action theory that will suffice for our discussion here.  This can 
be written formulaically in the following way:  
 
Factual beliefs + values + perceived behaviour control = intention ≈ action 
 
The component "factual beliefs" is straightforward here; we mean those beliefs 
that you have about the world that you believe to be true.  You might, of course, 
be in error.  Your values are your beliefs about things that are worth having and 
avoiding in life - philosophers sometimes call this your vision of the good.  
Perceived behaviour control is your belief about whether you are able to perform 
the action or not.  So, if someone believes smoking is linked to lung cancer, 
highly values his health and believes he can give up then he is likely to form the 
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intention to give up.  He will not necessarily go from intention to action: for 
example, because of addiction.   
 
From the shared values perspective, values remain constant across different 
people - we all place a high value on good health.  Therefore, people’s smoking 
behaviour is viewed as depending on their factual beliefs and their perceived 
behaviour control.  The thought then is that aside from public health education 
aimed at informing people of the risks, the other need is for public health 
measures aimed at, say, reducing peer pressure (e.g. limiting areas of smoking) 
and overcoming addiction (e.g. providing nicotine substitutes). 
 
The fault in the shared-values picture lies in the assumption that we all value 
good health similarly.  That this is not true is shown by the risky behaviour that 
some people indulge in where their perceived behaviour control is likely to be 
high (e.g. climbing).  What the shared value picture misses is the chance that 
people will see positive aspects to smoking.  Hilary Graham's research suggests 
something to this effect (Graham 1987).  Young unmarried mothers in deprived 
areas whom she spoke to valued the present benefits of smoking, for example, in 
giving them time to themselves, higher than they disvalued future harms.  The 
shared values argument also misses the possibility that some people may not 
particularly value a long life - if cigarettes provide solace in a fairly unhappy life 
then there seems little reason to give up.  Smoking may be part of a sub-culture 
in which its rebelliousness against authority is valued (Ling and Glantz 2002). 
Hence, there can be a pro-attitude to smoking.  It follows that the shared values 
argument is wrong: people could have the same factual beliefs about smoking 
and about behaviour control but have different values.  Hence the shared-values 
argument cannot be used as a non-utilitarian defence of using the full-effect 
criterion in evaluating public health education initiatives.1   
 
To sum up: we have argued that the full-effect evaluation of public health 
education is preferable to evaluating only behaviour change.  However, both 
methods are vulnerable to the criticism that they are compatible with the use of 
deception and propagandizing.  We have examined two responses to this 
                                            
1 The existence of pro-attitude smokers would raise a problem for those charged with 
meeting ever rising targets of smokers quitting.  The likelihood is that early campaigns 
will meet with success as those who want to give up are helped to do so.  Far more 
difficult will be the remainder who have no desire to quit. 
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criticism.  The first is that deception is justified for the good cause of the nation's 
health.  We argued that this is probably not compatible with an ethos of informed 
consent and respect for autonomy.  The second is the deception is not necessary; 
accurately informed people will make the right choices.  We only need to assess 
the extent to which people make the right choices to know whether or not they 
are properly informed.  We showed that this argument depends on a shared-
values view.  We argued that whilst this view seems to be reflected in public 
health literature, it is problematic.   
 
By default, this leaves us with the education approach to evaluation of public 
health education initiatives. If health care professionals were to take this 
approach to evaluation then it would be ethically acceptable for them to engage 
with people's factual beliefs and with their perceived behaviour control.  Hence if 
people don't believe smoking is harmful, or believe their addiction is 
insurmountable, public health education initiatives could correct these beliefs.  
However, a critic of this approach might say it does nothing to address pro-
attitude smokers, those who currently see smoking as positive overall.  This is 
unlike the full-effect and behaviour approaches where one is entitled to tackle 
smoking in whatever way is necessary. 
 
How might a defender of the education method of evaluation respond?  It is true 
that at the heart of the education approach is the ethical idea that it is wrong 
deliberately to distort or frame information in order to get a desired behavioural 
outcome.  This is a matter of principle, something like the principle of respect for 
autonomy.  To some extent it is also a matter of practicality.  Health education 
initiatives lose credibility if they are based on distortion; this is reflected in the 
emergence of an alternative "lay epidemiology" (Allmark and Tod 2006, Davison, 
Smith and Frankel 1991, Frankel, Davison and Smith 1991).  However, it does 
not follow that public health initiatives should not target people's values.  From 
the perspective of the education approach there is no reason in principle not to.  
The ethical case for or against doing so will come down to wider ethical beliefs. 
 
The case against engaging with people's values might begin from an assumption 
that it is wrong to impose your values on others.  As an example, it might be 
argued that it is wrong to make abortion illegal as this imposes anti-abortion 
views on those who don't share them.  In the context of health education, the 
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argument might be that it is wrong to try to change people's minds about what is 
and is not of value in their lives.  If someone has a pro-attitude to smoking 
despite knowing the medical facts then health education should leave it at that.  
Such a view will tend to draw on the idea that values are outside of rational 
criticism.  For example, some people like cakes or smoking, others do not; there 
are no rational arguments that would persuade individuals to change their 
values.   
 
However, this position can be challenged.  There appear to be some values that 
we do believe to be wrong, for example, torturing for fun.  In that we hold this to 
be wrong we are generally able to give reasons or arguments to defend our view.  
This would suggest that values are amenable to argument.  On this account, 
someone who believes that the pleasure of smoking now outweighs the future 
harm might be mistaken.  It would therefore be reasonable to engage with that 
person with a view to helping her see aright.   
 
Holding that people can be mistaken in their values does not require that you 
believe that the same values should hold for all people.  A full discussion of the 
rights and wrongs of smoking for an individual might still result with that person 
retaining a pro-attitude to smoking.  On the other hand, that individual might 
come to believe that he has not sufficiently valued, say, the effect of his early 
death on those around him.  As a result, his pro-attitude may change.  This 
argument could be reinforced by reference to certain basic shared values, such 
as good health.  Although it is not the case that we all value health equally, 
because some of us are willing to risk it or even lose it for other goods, it is 
certainly the case that for almost all people it is better not to be ill, other things 
being equal. 
 
We suggest, then, that public health professionals could be justified in tackling 
people's values; helping them think about whether they have got them right.  
Public health professionals probably do this already under descriptions such as 
"changing attitudes" or "changing cultures" (as in tackling the culture of binge 
drinking in the UK).  A good example is a television advertisement in which a 
young girl spoke to an interviewer about her father who was dying of lung cancer.  
She spoke very movingly about him and what she thought of smoking.  This 
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advert was not really concerned with conveying information; it was asking 
smokers to re-think their attitude to the habit, to re-evaluate. 
 
So it is not necessarily objectionable in principle for professionals to engage with 
people's values with a view to changing them.  There is, though, a difficult 
problem here.  Why should we focus on those with a pro-attitude to smoking 
rather than those with a pro-attitude to other risky behaviour such as climbing, 
horse-riding or driving?  Why are there no adverts asking climbers and horse-
riders to think about taking up a safer sport; or drivers to travel less and use 
lower-risk transportation? 
 
The answer is perhaps that smoking combines a unique set of factors: it risks 
harm to others; it is unpleasant to many; there is an element of addiction 
amongst those with the pro-attitude; it is a major cause of avoidable harm; the 
epidemiological evidence is strong; and both the habit and the pro-attitude are 
probably concentrated in relatively poor and powerless groups whilst its 
disparagers are wealthier and more powerful.  If this answer is along the right 
lines then the justification for intervention is clearly not straightforward.  It 
follows that it is not straightforward to say which health values professionals 
should tackle.  It seems revealing that many public health campaigns are focused 
on areas that encompass traditional vices: intemperance (smoking and drinking); 
gluttony (obesity); sloth (exercise); and lust (sexual health).  Perhaps this 
underlines Buchanan’s (2006) point, that health education is a moral and 
political enterprise.  If so, public health professionals walk a line between 
justified advice and unjustified moralising. 
 
Conclusion 
Using the example of smoking and lung cancer we have argued that public 
health education initiatives should not be evaluated solely on the basis of 
behavioural outcomes or overall (full-effect) outcomes.  The latter is better than 
the former in that it involves looking for undesired side effects of your 
interventions as well as whether they had the desired effect of changing 
behaviour.  However, both fall foul of a non-utilitarian ethic that disallows 
deception.  If only behaviour change or health outcomes matter then the way we 
achieve those outcomes is of less concern; if deception is necessary to change 
behaviour then perhaps it should be deployed.  We argued that this is not the 
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spirit in which health education should be conducted; that is, as a medium for 
imparting knowledge.  We also argued that it might be appropriate to use health 
education as a focus for personal reflection on values.  There is little ethical 
problem in justifying health education initiatives on lung cancer and smoking, 
because the epidemiological evidence is so strong.  However, the case for value-
tackling initiatives is more complex and subtle.  Health is almost universally of 
value to people; knowing that some activities pose immense risk to health helps 
them in making decisions.  But public health professionals perhaps need to take 
stock before embarking on value-based campaigns, such as the tearful girl.  They 
should ask - why the pro-attitude smokers; why the culture of binge drinking; 
why teenage sex; and why not teenage horse riding, middle-aged drivers and 
exercise addicts with crumbling joints?  Insofar as health education initiatives 
seek to change people's values as well as their knowledge, professionals need to 
think carefully about whether and why they are justified in doing so. 
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